July 2000

Prospects in the Middle East

Relations between Syria and Israel

The political relations between Syria and Israel have been focused on territory and on a totally out of control enemy perception understanding. The territorial dispute is based on the fact that Israel is illegally occupying Syrian territory, the Golan heights and that it had occupied a security zone in Lebanon for nearly two decades.

The enemy perception of both countries is much more diffuse as it can only partly traced back to facts, the majority of the perception is psychology, history and imaginative. The Syrian enemy perception is based on the historical battle between the good Arab/Islam and the bad Jewish/crusader contradiction. And on the idea that the young Israeli nation robbed Arab land, suppressed and extradited the Arab population and they continue to expand and behave rather aggressively.

The Israeli enemy perception is just as paranoid as it uses to consider every move of the other side as a conspiration against the existence of Israel. As Syria is allegedly not willing to accept Israel as an equal neighbor, it is and ally of Iran, it is supporting Islamic fundamentalism and through its influence in Lebanon it allowed the Hizbullah to operate freely against the Israeli Defence Force and its allies of the South Lebanese Army. The IDF and SLA were operating in the former security zone in Lebanon to protect Israel from infiltration and missile attacks out of the north.

The security zone in Lebanon has now been eliminated by Israel just as the current prime-minister, Ehud Barak, promised to do so as he was elected. The withdrawal was however not an organised affair in the sense of a negotiated withdrawal. It was an unilateral affair, Israel wanted to limit, end, the casualties in Lebanon which seemed to increase every year as the IDF and SLA were sitting ducks in the attacks of the elusive Hizbullah. The Hizbullah gained the initiative in the fight about southern Lebanon were as the IDF and SLA were forced on the defensive and were limited to patrol the region to show presence and to react out of their strenghtened positions and incur losses during the very well planned Hizbullah ambushes, attacks and mines/boobytraps.

The much heralded peace process which should solve all problems between Syria and Lebanon on one side and Israel on the other side was weakened by the several seperate agreements of Israel and its hostile neighbors and it collapsed after a draft agreement leaked to the press and this compromised the position of Hafez al-Assad who considered himself as the protector of the Arabs and the man who would not sacrifice the Arab case like Egypt, Sadat, Jordan, Hussein, and the PLO, Arafat, had done to reach a peace agreement with Israel. Assad wanted an Arab all encompassing agreement agreed between equals without any sweeteners to facilitate some kind of compromise to the sole advantage of Israel. The collapse of the peace process was therefore not about facts but about procedures. Very simplified, Israel should first withdraw, or show the intention to do so, before Syria could negotiate directly and seriously and accept any peace treaty. The leakage made Assad look like exchanging the Golan for peace something he refused to do.

The relations with Syria seemed to be in a stalemate as no side was able nor willing to give up something. The recent dead of the lion of Damascus, the long sitting president of Syria, Hafez al-Assad, could bring some changes to the relations between the long time foes.

Changes in Syria

The relations between Israel and Syria were heavily influenced by the person of Hafez al-Assad. As the longest sitting president in the region, Assad was present at all developments between the two countries. And the military success of Israel in the three wars against Syria made Assad very suspicious to Israeli proposals to promote peace in the region. Everything short of an unconditional total return of the Golan heights was unacceptable for Syria. The return should therefor happen before a peace treaty could be completed. The Golan is Syrian territory so exchanging your own property for something in return is like a cigar out of your own cigarbox. A compromise with regard to the time table or giving Israel larger parts of the Golan would be unacceptable.

The dead of Assad could eventually change the situation as his successor could and would be more open to a compromise on the timetable and even to some overdone Israeli security concerns.

Immediately after the dead of Assad it was decided by the political elite in the country, the topbrass of the Baath party, to nominate Hafez al-Assad’s son, Bashar al-Assad, as the new president. As the continuity and the positions of the party could be protected best with Bashar as president. And after all it was the wish of Hafez al-Assad

The parliament supported the choice of the Baath party and in turn voted that the age to be eligible as president was to be lowered from 40 to 34, the age of Bashar. The parliament nominated Bashar for the same reasons as the Baath party, continuity and the preservation of stability.

The people of Syria will most likely support the election of Bashar as the new president as Assad is at the moment quite popular in the country and they will like to fulfil Assad’s last wish to have Bashar as president. The referendum in the second week of July 2000 will endorse the choice of Bashar al-Assad. The people of Syria are thereby moderate in their wishes as they want economic progress and a little more freedom like a more liberal press and the access to the World Wide Web. And they assume, Bashar as a young and educated men will most probably fulfil their demands.

The biggest opposition against Bashar will come form the Islamic-Sunnite fundamentalists, a militant opposition movement who demand a new start and the end of the authoritarian Baath regime. The militants have been harshly suppressed with a culmination in 1982 when approximately 20.000 got killed after an uprise against the Assad government. In 1982 they failed as Assad could rely on his security forces. Bashar on the other hand is more vulnerable as he still has to receive the loyalty of the armed and security forces. But it will be very unlikely that they would support the militants as they will pose an equal threat to the security forces as to Bashar.

Another big threat to the newly elected president is the claim of Rifaat al-Assad, his uncle and brother of Hafez, to the presidency. Rifaat tried to take over power in 1983 after which he has been exiled in Marbella, Spain. Rifaat considers himself as the most able to become president and he might still have some friends in the country. But the influence should not be overestimated as most friendships and alliances will not survive 17 years of exile and out of power/influence. The lack of support became evidently as the security forces claimed that they will arrest Rifaat if he would show up in Syria.

Finally, the most immediate threat to Bashar are the armed and security forces. Some general might like to do what Hafez al-Assad did and take over power. Bashar, not a military man by trade, is dependent on the goodwill of the armed and security forces to stay in power. The position of Bashar is somewhat saver because of the economical problems, the negative international impact of coup d’etat by the military and the acceptance of the military of Bashar as an acceptable alternative with no strong links to no side and with no ambitions to become involved in the armed forces..

The policy of Bashar will therefore be centred first on the consolidation of his position. Create alliances in the administration, Baath party and with the all important military and security apparatus. Secondly, improve the economy of the country and satisfy some demands out of the population, like a little bit more freedom. And only on the third place Bashar will move outside and will talk about stability in the region.

Any speculation about Bashar or his policy because he is someone new in the region with fresh ideas like the kings of Jordan and Morocco should be very careful. It is correct thay they are all high educated young men without being brought up of the old connections/hierarchy system, until now free of to the old bad habits and no direct involvement in old nasty conflicts. They are young, are not compromised by history and are highly educated but the leaders of Jordan and Morocco are much more powerful in creating a new policy. Bashar is contrarily much more dependent on allies in the administration, Baath party and the military. Bashar can be more open to new ideas, compromises, in negotiations but in the end he is dependent on the approval of his sponsors in the old hierarchy. This will limit any new and changing policy in the Middle East political constellation.

The impact on the region

The situation in the region, Syria, Lebanon and Israel, will not experience big changes on the short term. The impact of the change of power in Syria will only become visible if certain conditions in Syria will be fulfilled and at best become visible on the medium term.

The first and most important condition for change will be the survival of Bashar al-Assad as president of Syria. Secondly Bashar should be able to implement economic reforms, create progress and a liberalisation of the society. This should put him in a strong position to enforce the foreign policy we all expect from him. Namely to put Syria on the chart as a sensible country with the aim to reach a peace agreement with Israel and help the region to achieve political, economical and social progress. This idea might be however a little bit to much wish thinking.

Political reality will force Syria, Bashar, to small internal changes to reach eventually even smaller changes in Syria’s foreign policy. Bashar will most likely be able to become and stay president but a fast agreement with its neighbours and essentially at the expense of Syria will be out he question. The influence of Hafez al-Assad and the still large influence of the Baath party and military will only allow small deviations from the Hafez al-Assad designed peace plan. The return of the Golan heights might eventually be part of the peace treaty instead of a condition before the peace treaty. But any more compromises will be very difficult to gain from Syria.

The virtual stand still between Israel en Syria will only change slowly. But Syria and Israel will come closer together in the coming two years. The path towards cooperation will be an uphill and slow one. It will take patience and stamina from both sides to continue the peace process. The expectations are high and both sides want to maximise the results in all negotiations to satisfy the demands out of both countries. Israel wants security, the right to keep some Kibbutzim on the Golan and most of the water. Syria wants the return of the Golan heights according to the borders of 1967 when they lost them to Israel. Syria wants to Golan back without to many, to none, conditions. Essentially, this has been more or less accepted in negotiations with Israeli officials but political pressure out of Israel forced Israel to demand some additional rights and territory. A compromise is certainly possible but it has to be sweetened to be acceptable to both sides.

The instability in Lebanon will most likely lessen after Israel left the country. There will be some differences about the exact border demarcation and some attacks from the Hizbullah but now Israel is able to respond better to any attack. And the Hizbullah will be much less effective because they lost their striking power. The Hizbullah lost the territorial advantage and the initiative both very important in fighting a much stronger foe. The problems, border demarcation, in Lebanon are thereby now better suited to be ended by negotiations. The international dimension, Syria’s and Iran influence, has been eliminated making it a problem between two countries so much more controllable.

The influence of Syria, including the Syrian armed forces in Lebanon, will also become lesser as Lebanon, especially the Lebanese population, is getting enough of the Syrians in the country. Israel has already withdrawn thus eliminating the main reason for Syria to be around and more importantly the Syrian population is getting enough from the deployment in Lebanon as being stationed there is more dangerous and very expensive. Socio-economic pressures will force the Syrian government to evaluate the deployment in Lebanon.

The region will become a little bit more safe on the medium term as the political differences are replaced by social and economical questions which are finally receiving more attention. The new leaders of the region are more or less forced to change their policies, the long term dominating security/military policy has become to expensive and socio-economic problems are increasing. The change of policy has become more urgent as the political motivated support from the now disfunct Soviet Union had ended. This meant all military expenses were now for their own account, and no friendship prices, all products and services only against hard currencies. The countries, especially Syria, have to spend more on defence to maintain existing capabilities but the costs have become higher, the revenues lower and the socio-economic demands larger, ergo, change your policy before you will go bankrupt, be forced to change your policy or being put out of office.

So the new leaders will most likely adress the new problems and have the advantage that they are not inhibited by the old contradictions which led to several wars and conflicts in the recent history of the region. A negotiated solution to all existing problems seems to be very likely but these negotiations will take some time and all negotiating skills will be used, including threats and walk-outs, to improve the situation. The road towards more stability and cooperation is however entered and a return will be ever more difficult.