June 1999

Indonesia revisited

Indonesia, a divided country

A short review

Indonesia have received more than their fair share of troubles in recent times. They were not only severely hit by the Asian economic crisis, admittedly this was largely home made, but the contradictions in the country seemed to erupt or intensify beyond everything that was thought possible.

The majority of differences, latent conflicts, which were existent in Indonesia could be pacified until the beginning of the economic crisis by the fantastic economic growth and progress and by an accepted system of more or less silent suppression. A strong government based on the much glorified Asiatic values was the best system for Indonesia at least this was the common thinking in the booming years. This semi-dictatorial system of government delivered to nearly all people some kind of economic bonus. Only a few groups of people refused to cooperate in some way or the other in the Indonesian miracle. These were in course mercilessly prosecuted and suppressed as became clear in Irian-Jaya and on Sumatra and especially in Aceh.

The booming economic development and the activities of the Indonesian security forces could create some kind of artificial security in Indonesia but this could only last that long as the regional and economic circumstances remained positive.

The economic crisis destroyed all old and vested alliances and the societal structure of Indonesia. The currency devalued, companies went bankrupt, unemployment risen to unknown levels, the traditional political and economical elites ousted and maybe the most dangerous of all old soars, contradictions, in the 100+ peoples and 1.000+ island country became active again.

Indonesia anno 1999

As the old government and the majority of the political and military leadership was removed from office an interim government under the leadership of president B.J. Habibi took over the helm. The economic crisis continued but it bottomed as the first international financial support packages arrived, things did not get any worser at least economically.

The political situation on the other hand stayed in the wild waters of uncertainty as the power position of the government was questioned and antagonists to the government Golkar party and the Indonesian federation became more active.

President Habibi managed to create some economic stability but the upcoming elections and the ethnic and independent induced movements all over the country created widespread political and social instability.

The delayed elections which are planned for the beginning of June 1999 will not bring the much needed political stability to rebuild the country. There are a number of problems of diverse nature which will prevent the much needed national support. There is first the legitimacy problem of the government. Second the large number parties which fragmentate the opposition. Third the ethnic tensions. And fourth the independence movements on a number of islands or regions. The third and fourth problem go sometimes together which makes the situation even more explosive.

The government

The government is under siege in Indonesia. The political inheritance from the Suharto regime and the performance of the Habibi government is undermining the position of the government, its institutions and its representatives.

The government of Indonesia is still linked with the wrong doings of the Suharto regime. The unfair and often wrong economic policies and the harsh suppression of any kind of opposition by the security forces has made the government disliked. This triangle of government institutions, the Golkar party and the military and security forces, ABRI, are governing the country and the majority of those people are more or less Suharto people, or are at least perceived as such. The highest leaders and the most extreme cases are removed from office but the lower echelons are still present.

President Habibi has introduced some improvements in the economic field and in the treatment of the opposition but more out of necessity than out of conviction. The changes have created some disagreement in the government between what we like to call the reformers and the traditional groups like the armed and security forces.

The reformers in the government want to modernise the country with the introduction of accountability and a western style economic policy. The traditionalists do more or less agree with this policy because it is necessary to rebuilt the country. The changes in the composition of the government structure and parliament is questioned as it diminishes the influence of the traditionalists and the all powerfull military. The security policy and especially the ideas of autonomy or even independence for some parts of Indonesia are totally unacceptable to the traditionalists. For them this is a death sin against the fundamental principles of a united Indonesia.

The inheritance of the former regime, incompetency of the current government and the rift in the government are considerably undermining the position of the government and its abilities to deal with the many problems which exist in Indonesia.

The multitude of parties

The opposition in Indonesia is very fragmented if one is considering the number of parties which want to take part in the elections. There 183 parties listed for the elections. You can view them on the internet at http://www.detik.com/analisa/199808/19980828-0950.html.

A large number of these parties do not have a lot of support and/or are limited to just one group or region. The majority are focussed on just their own particular interest. Consequently they will not make a big impact on the elections and only a couple of the larger parties will be represented in the new parliament. And a coalition of these rather different parties will form the new government.

But even the larger parties are very fragmented in Indonesia. The governing Golkar party, which has a large following with everybody who is some way connected with the government, does not have enough support in the society to keep their important position. The rift in the government is thereby undermining the position of Golkar. Golkar is further significantly undermined by allegations of the use of violence against the oppostion and they might even be not allowed to take part in the elections.

The other large parties, the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI-P, under the leadership of Megawati Sukarno-Putri, the Partai Kebangtikan Bangsa, PKB, of Abdurrahman Wahid often called as Gus Dur leader of Hahdlatul Ulama the largest muslim organisation in the country, and the PAN of Amien Rais, leader of Muhammdiya the second largest muslim organisation in the country, will have a larger impact on the elections.

They have created some kind of alliance in the time to the elections. This allaince is very opportunistic as the policy of each of them is to different to remain valid after the elections. But in the months before the elections, Indonesia did not experience the expected violence between the many parties. This is mainly the result of the close cooperation between the three large parties, PDI-P, PKB and PAN.

The elections in Indonesia are largely an affair of personalities. Megawati Sukarno-Putri, Gus Dur and Amien Rais are all strong personalities and the election campaigns are around them. This has made cooperation in the time before the elections very easy and beneficial. They have all the same goal the removal of Golkar and Habibi who are not very popular in Indonesia. If that goal is achieved the cooperation will prove to be much more complicated as the ideology of each differs and party politics will start playing an important role again.

The parties in Indonesia can be divided into two main groups, the Islamic oriented parties and the Pantjasila oriented group. The Islamic oriented parties are mostly moderate parties which want to some extent a more islamic dominated society. This should however not be mistaken with the Middle Eastern versions of Islam kind of countries.

The Pantjasila oriented parties are all based on the five values for unity in Indonesia, Believe in God, humanity, social justice, nationalism and people’s sovereignity. These principals are the foundation of the Indonesian state ideology since its existence as one nation. The goal of all these parties, including the PDI-P, is essentially a same kind of Indonesia as existed before the economic crisis except without the corruption and the Suharto style of nepotism but with more democracy.

Ethnic conflicts

Indonesia is a country consisting out of many islands and each island has one or more kind of people living on it. The majority of the people are of muslim religion but the original population of many islands are of christian or animist faith.

The Indonesian archipel have known for centuries migrations of people between the islands. The number of people migrating were mostly low and the slow. The newcomers integrated more or less in the society without creating to much friction. The newcomers were different and remained so but there was no hostility as they did not compete in the economy and had just little political influence.

The Indonesian government had thereby for many years a policy of transmigration. The transmigration had firstly the goal of eliminating the over population of the island of Java. Java is essentially the main island of Indonesia. The political and economical leadership is located on Java and all important ideas and movements originated on Java since the days of colonialism. And secondly it should improve and accelarate the development of the other islands. And thirdly it should change the composition of the population of the most important islands in favour of the Javanese.

This transmigration policy worked well in the beginning but as the numbers of Javanese on the islands began to rise dramatically and started to dominate the islands the attitude of the original population became more hostile. The Suharto regime and the economic progress could suppress the hostile attitude on the islands but some hardliners, the people and organisations who also demand autonomy or independence, on the islands and especially the economic crisis turned the situation against migrants and even violent.

The economic competition, the struggle for political power, the rise of the idea of muslim identity and the economic crisis as a multiplier made any small difference and problem in Indonesia escalate into a contradiction of national importance or even survival.

On Java the muslim majority against the Christians and the Chinese minority. On the Moluku islands between the original Christian population against the muslim migrants. On Sulawesi, Celebes, between migrants and the original Dayak population. And so on, nearly all islands with a larger migrant community are in turmoil.

Autonomy and independence

As a federation Indonesia has a large number of different people living in the country. Some of the areas and people were inherited from the colonial days, some peacefully added to the federation others however were outright conquered by Indonesia.

Until the economic crisis the federation could be kept together by the economic progress, the financial support the government good give to the areas, especially the poorer regions, and by the suppression of any opposition to the Indonesian rule.

The carrot and stick method had worked well for some areas but a number of hardliner opposition groups continued their struggle for more autonomy or even independence.

The economic crisis and the internal power crisis of the government gave a number of groups the opportunity to ventilate their thoughts about the future of Indonesia and particularly the future of their region. The majority of the islands would like to receive some kind of autonomy within Indonesia. This wish has become stronger because of the ethnically inspired violence on the islands. The peoples of the Moluka islands, Sulawesi (Celebes), Borneo and a number of other small groups demand more influence, political power, in the government of the island or region.

The situation on Sumatra is more difficult. There are some people who want more autonomy but their number is falling. As ever more people and especially the organised groups demand secession from Indonesia. The southern part of Sumatra is more autonomy minded but the more north you go it will get more independent minded. The region of Aceh is the most fanatic in their struggle for independence. Sumatra or parts of Sumatra, like Aceh, possess enough natural resources to make an independent state economically viable.

The most fanatic groups fighting for independency on Sumatra are the GPK, the GAM and Aceh Merdaka. The withdrawal and softening of the policy of the Indonesian armed forces, especially the Kopassus special forces, from and on Sumatra have not brought the independence movements to the negotiation table. On the contrary, they have used the weakness of the government to their advantage and intensified the fight for their goals.

Some of the conquered parts of the Indonesian state are also not pacified. On Irian Jaya a small organisation, OPM, Organisasi Papua Merdaka, continues to fight the Indonesian occupation. The OPM has become relativily stronger as the Indonesian forces have been weakened by the economic crisis. The OPM weak in men, arms and support has seen some opportunities by a combination of increased military pressure on the Indonesian government and diplomatic pressure to get some promises from the government about the future of Irian Jaya. Something like the autonomy/independence referendum like the one on East-Timor.

Another more violent and complex problem is on East-Timor. Indonesia conquered East-Timor after the former colonial power Portugal left East-Timor. The East-Timorese never accepted the Indonesian occupation and resisted it from the beginning. Only because of the widely and inhumane use of the security forces Indonesia could keep control of the region. The muslim Indonesian forces and migrants and the in majority Christian East-Timorese gave the conflict an additional explosive character.

After a prolonged fight between the Indonesian security forces and the Fretilin, the East-Timor organisation which is fighting for independence, the economic crisis and the subsequent changes in the government forced the government to look for an alternative policy. The Indonesian government turned their policy by180 degrees and offered East-Timor on the short term a referendum with the choice of autonomy or independence.

This was greeted by the Fretilin and others supporting the independency but they warned in the mean time for negative side effects. They demanded the disarmement of the people which were armed by the government to protect themselves against the Fretilin. Because these people would oppose the autonomy or independence as they would loose their position in the East-Timorese society. They would not hesitate to use their weapons to frighten people in the elections who support the independence and fight the results of the elections.

This offer of Indonesia could also be a way to show East-Timor and the international community that they are necessary in the region to maintain law and order. They are the factor between order and the chaos of war. But the autonomy/independence offer has been opposed by the traditionalists and the armed forces in Indonesia as they are afraid of a domino theory. All Indonesian people/islands would now demand autonomy or independence about which they are partly right. The traditionalists are however to weakened by the economic crisis to oppose the policy of the Habibi government. But Habibi has most likely received an enemy for live by this offer and has split the government into two groups.

The problems in East-Timor are far from over. The Indonesians still control the region and the future looks bleak as the pro- and anti- independence supporters are prepared and waiting to attack eachother. They are just waiting for the signal to begin.

Summarized it can be stated that Indonesia has a number of people living in regions which would like or even demand more autonomy and even some of them independence. The position, at least the power position as the majority of the regions have also been hit by the economic crisis, of the several peoples living on the islands have been improved as the government of Indonesia have become weaker and entangled in many social and economical problems which demand their fullest attention.

The many peoples country Indonesia is however dominated by the Javanese who are also in fact governing the country until now, 1999, by the triangle of the semi-allies of the Suharto-clan, the Golkar party and the armed forces, ARBRI. They are all more or less bounded to the pantjasila ideology of a united Indonesia. All those autonomy and independence sounds out of the provinces are unnatural for the government and they vehemently oppose them. All changes in the form and structure of Indonesia are forced up on to them by the economic crisis and the internal political weakness. The increased attention to the muslim religion and identity is in the meantime increasing the tensions between the several religions and the many different peoples.

Future expectations

The situation in Indonesia is not likely to improve on the short term. There are a number of social and economical problems which surfaced after the economic crisis of 1997. These problems were increased as political, ethnic and religious differences on Java but more dramatically on the many other and non-Javanese islands erupted.

Ethnic and religious inspired violence happened all over the country. This will continue until all people are living in their own homogenous area and the economy will show substantial strength.

The political structure and security organisations became under pressure and started a transformation and a cutback of functions. The government had become weaker and the demands for more autonomy and independence became louder and are uncontrollable by the government. The economic and political weaknesses had and has made the goverment unable to cope with the demands out of the regions in particular and the many social and economical problems in general.

The current government of president Habibi has and will not be able to solve the many problems of social, economical and political nature. They need to create political and social stability to have economic stability. This will prove difficult to attain as long as the economy remains weak. A vicious circle from which it will be difficult to escape without foreign support and more important substantial offers to the peoples outside Java. Which in turn would dissatisfy the Javanese.

The same is valid for the opposition as they are committed to the pantjasila ideology of a united Indonesia, as is the Habibi government, or the muslim oriented parties which want a united Indonesia with an islamic flavour. Both will alienate the many peoples living in the provinces, e.g. the many islands of the archipel.

The elections will not bring the solution to the problem as all the major opposition parties are Javanese and as mentioned before committed to an united Indonesia. Difficult choices have to be made which will meet a lot of opposition from the majority of Javanese muslims. But democracy is more than just the representation of the interest of one group it is also the protection of the minorities. And as long the PDI-P, the PKB, the PAN or for that matter Golkar do not understand and apply the idea of protection of the minorities they will not be able to keep Indonesia together.

If the main Indonesian parties and the government cannot control the muslim mob and remain ignorant of the wishes of the many peoples in Indonesia political and social stability will be impossible to accomplish. Only an Indonesia as a federation were all, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Sulawesi (Celebes), Moluka islands and so on are fairly represented will be able to return to a strong and united Indonesia as it seemed to be before the economic crisis of 1997.

There will be a big and decisive task for the new government in Indonesia if they want to return Indonesia to the tiger countries of south-east Asia. If they fail to solve the big problems of Indonesia it will most probably mean a different and smaller Indonesia in the next milennium.

On the short term the military and the internal security services are able to subdue any movement which want to change the structure of Indonesia. None of the independence movements are something of an equal opponent to the military. But the political costs, national and international, and the economical consequences might be prohibitive high to execute a ruthless suppression of the independence movements in Indonesia. A political solution is the only opportunity for Indonesia to survive as an united nation on the long term.