May 1999

The Kosovo conflict, history, exits and future

Kosovo a new Bosnia, were opposing ethnic groups do their utmost to make live unbearable for the other side. Including ethnic cleansing and occasional mass murders to create facts which will prove difficult to change in the future. The goal of all those operations is to exclusively reserve a part of territory for their own group.

A peace which only could be reached at the point of a gun or for that matter at the point of a cruise missile. In the Bosnia conflict peace could be reached by the use of NATO forces, IFOR and SFOR, and that peace can be maintained just by the stationing of a large contigent of forces. Does Kosovo get and even need a similar treatment.

Bosnia have been pacified and they could, with some problems and differences, start with the reconstruction of the country. If the current Kosovo problem is solved, the people in Kosovo have to do the same. But the international community is willing to help and a new Balkan wide kind of Marschall plan is being put together. This should boost the economic development and with some luck social relations in the region.

A short history

The Serbian minority of about 10% of the population of Kosovo which at their height, before the second world war, made up 30-40% of the population and the Serbians as a whole who have strong historical connections with Kosovo want to remain in control in the region.

The autonomy status granted to Kosovo by the late president Tito was changed in 1990 into a provincial status under direct control of Belgrad. The Kosovo-Albanians were satisfied with the autonomy but the remaining Serbian minority had the perception that they were treated unjust in general by the Albanian majority and particularly because of the positions they occupied. Especially the Albanians who had a position in the government apparatus. The Serbians protested loudly and violently and demanded immediate action out of Serbia, Belgrad.

The Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic first wanted to pacify the situation in the normal communist way. They were after all comrades in a communist country. Differences between peoples, especially the working classes, were impossible according the communist ideology or world view.

After the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe and Russia, Milosevic recognized the potential of the Serbian claims in Kosovo. The nationalistic card provided an opportunity the consolidate his power generally in Yugoslavia and particularly in Serbia. The take over of Kosovo rallied, as expected, the Serbians behind Milosevic and gave the Serbians in Kosovo their demanded powerfull and preferred position.

The Kosovo-Albanians reacted in the first six to seven years with a policy of peacefull resistance. They created a kind of shadow society in Kosovo out of, as mentioned before, resistance and necessity. But they were essentially forced to have a separate society because the Albanians were pushed out of all government positions and out of the larger companies in the region which were still owned and managed by the state or better Belgrad.

As the peacefull resistance was not particularly succesfull an increasing number of the Kosovo-Albanians looked for an alternative. The Ushtria Clirimatare e Kosoves – Kosovo Liberation Army, UCK-KLA, which wanted to force out the Serbians by force attracted ever more support. Especially when the UCK-KLA proved to be the only group who did something and who promised some protection against the suppression of the Serbians and the actions, sometimes even atrocities, of the Serbian security forces. The protection proved to be an illusion as the first larger scale Serbian operations against the UCK-KLA and on a smaller scale against the population started.

Methodically the Serbian security forces took over control in the border areas with Albania, here the first ethnic cleansing started, and almost simultaneously the Serbian started to force out the UCK-KLA out of the territories they claimed to control. The UCK-KLA crumbled under the first Serbian pressure and were forced to retreat into the mountains and to Albania and to a lesser extent Macedonia.

International mediation brought some temporary relieve to the UCK-KLA as some Serbian security units were withdrawn and international observers of the Organisation for Security and Cooperationin Europe, OSCE, moved in to verify the withdrawal and future operations of the Serbian security forces.

This gave the UCK-KLA an opportunity to regroup, retake some of the lost territory and to assault Serbian security units. The OSCE observers were able to limit the operations of the Serbian security forces. The increased activities of the UCK-KLA, which proved to be more resilient and stronger than anticipated by the Serbians, led to increased activities including new atrocities in Kosovo against the Kosovo-Albanians by the Serbian security forces.

The Serbian atrocities led to international, especially western, demands to end the Serbian activities, start diplomatic negotiations to solve the problem and finally to the creation of the Rambouillet agreement which the Yugoslav government found unacceptable. The Rambouillet agreement would give something to all parties. It declared autonomy for Kosovo in Yugoslavia for at least three years whereafter the future of Kosovo would be arranged by a conference, the best protection imagineable for minorities and the stationing of a NATO force, KFOR, including Russians and Ukrainians, in Kosovo to execute the agreement. Just like SFOR in Bosnia.

The stationing of an international NATO led force, KFOR, was unacceptable for Yugoslavia, Serbia. They considered it as an right to occupy the whole of Yugoslavia. This is however a falsification as the Rambouillet treaty clearly defines does and doesnots of KFOR. The name NATO, which is mentioned in the annex to the Rambouillet agreement, stands for the coalition of forces which were to be stationed in Kosovo and therefore is the same as KFOR. NATO would be the partner in the Rambouillet agreement with Yugoslavia just as NATO is the partner in the Dayton agreement with Bosnia where SFOR is the implementation force of the agreement.

The Serbians were from the beginning againt a diplomatic solution as another plan was preferred. Namely the elimination of the Kosovo problem by a combination of ethnic cleansing and subjugation of the Kosovo-Albanians. To attain thet goal the Serbians increased the number of security units in Kosovo and the scale of the operations against the Kosovo-Albanians. This led to the withdrawal of the OSCE observers and finally to the first air strikes by NATO forces. The west expected that Milosevic would accept the Rambouillet agreement after a couple of days of air strikes.

The west underestimated, just like the Serbians underestimated the UCK-KLA, the resistance of Milosevic. The Serbians did not accept the western demands and accelerated a large scale campaign to solve the problem in the old fashion. They started to ethnically clean large areas of Kosovo-Albanians. Consequently large crowds of refugees fled into neighbouring countries. The identity cards of the fleeing Kosovo-Albanians were confiscated and the population records destroyed. The existence of all refugees was essentially destroyed.

The continuing air campaign could do nothing to stop the Serbian security forces, who in the meantime received support of shady militias like the Arkan Tigers, in their operation to ethnically clean Kosovo. The human tragedy of over a half million refugees in Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro and about the same number in Kosovo is a clear proof of Serbia’s inhumane policy.

The air strikes at Yugoslavia have destroyed a large part of its command and control system, air force and defence systems, military property, military and civilian infrastructure and capabilities in oilproduction and arms and arms related industry. Yugoslav, Serbian, industrial and defence capabilities have been severely degraded by the air campaign. And first signs of weakness have become visible in the Serbian society and political leadership.

The air campaign cannot deliver short term results but if it continues it will cripple or better virtually destroy Yugoslav economy. The price for noncooperation, non adherence, to the ideas of the Rambouillet agreement will be very high.

Exit options

There are several scenarios how the conflict might be ended or what policies are available to end it. There are about four options which are possible or acceptable to happen.

The first is the acceptance of the Yugoslav government of the ideas which were presented in the Rambouillet agreement. The second option is the continuation of the current policy. Force Yugoslavia to comply to the ideas of Rambouillet. The third option is an agreement between the two sides to stop all military activities and start a new round of negotiations. And the fourth option is the use of ground forces to end the Serbian acitivities in Kosovo.

There are ofcourse more options but they are less likely or even impossible to happen.

Acceptance of agreement

The easiest and fastest way to end the conflict is the Serbian acceptance of the ideas of the Rambouillet agreement. Even if this demands some compromises from both sides. Rambouillet might be considered death but the ideas about the protection of people, the institution of civil rights to guarantee the rights of minorities and the stationing principle remain as valid as before.

The end of the air campaign would stop the disastrous effects of the air strikes at several important parts of Yugoslavia. A Rambouillet like agreement would guarantee the rights of the Serbian minority where as Kosovo would remain part of Yugoslavia. It would be the best position attainable for the Serbs. But they should be quick because the longer they wait the stronger the UCK-KLA will become. The UCK-KLA have demands and wishes of their own and the more they have to fight, the more they gain and the more Kosovo-Albanins suffer in Kosovo and abroad in refugee camps the more power and influence the UCK-KLA will get.

The diplomatic position of the Serbian side is weakening and the position of the Kosovo-Albanians will improve. An independent Kosovo will be one of the possibilities if they wait to long. The Serbian policy of creating facts and act on it could backfire. They might get a Kosovo which they can not control as the UCK-KLA with support of the NATO would beat the Serbian security forces and control ever larger tracts of land.

Continuation of policy

The second option is the continuation of the current air campaign, the limited use of the battle helicopter – artillery combination and an increase of attrition warfare of the UCK-KLA against the Serbian security forces. The weather improvements will make the air assaults and the air support of the UCK-KLA ever more effective and they will slowly but certainly destroy Serbian capabilities.

This policy will take longer but a victory of NATO will be certain as the fighting power and the logistic support of the Serbian security forces will slowly be destroyed. The UCK-KLA will be active in supporting this operation as their fighting power has increased, their logisitic support improved and military support, close air support, has dramatically been improved. The UCK-KLA has learned a lot of its two former defeats by the Serbian security forces. The organisation structure, strategy and tactics and the quality of the fighting men has been improved.

The much improved UCK-KLA is very motivated to continue the struggle against the Serbian security forces. As they fight and conquer parts of Kosovo they will get a bigger and more important say in every political solution which might be concluded.

If NATO has to force the Yugoslav – Serbian forces out of Kosovo or adhere to the conditions set in the Rambouillet treaty the Serbian position will be fundamentally undermined. In the following negotiations it can be stated with a high degree of certainty that an independent Kosovo will be one of the options. The UCK-KLA will hold after a prolonged fight/struggle considerable parts of Kosovo and they will be very unwilling, even not willing, to hand back Kosovo to an international force or allow any Serbian official or entity to stay in the area. The UCK-KLA is and has become a powerfactor of which little is known but it is or has created facts which will be difficult to circumvent. Any agreement, if you like or not, will need the consent and cooperation of the UCK-KLA.

Diplomacy

The third option, not very likely, would be the cessation of hostilities and the resumation of negotiations between the Yugoslav government, NATO and the Kosovo-Albanians.

A third country for example Russia could persuade all sides to give diplomacy another chance to solve the problem. In the negotiations, under Russian leadership or guidance, a compromise should be reached which would satisfy all sides and most important would protect the Serbian position on the Balkan. This will be however very difficult with a high level of wish thinking. The Kosovo-Albanians and NATO would have to give a lot just to satisfy Serbia and even condone the ethnic cleansing. And this would be unacceptable to NATO and the international community. The position of Russia remains important and any solution and especially the implication should be ideally with political support and military involvement of Russia. But not at all cost should Russia be accomodated, more important issues are at stake.

Russia has been calling for the cessation of hostilities from the start of the air campaign. They did so out of concern of their Serbian allies. Both, Serbs and Russian are of Slavic descent and this has created a kind of kinship. Out of tradition and the communist and nationalistic parties in Russia are favouring to support the Serbians. And in time of elections provides the Kosovo-conflict a very good opportunity to rally support in the population. By exaggeration and one side views at the happenings the Serbians are portrayed as the victims of NATO agression who are in need for support of their big Slavic brother. This picture of the situation has been modified a little to temper the feelings as their was talk of world war III and agression against western targets in Russia. But Russia remains on the side of Yugoslavia.

Russia even if economically a chaos remains a great power with a lot of nuclear weapons. The west, NATO, has to respect Russia and its sentiments about Serbia. And therefore any solution, to attain and execute, should preferably involve Russia. Russia could play an important role as a mediator to end the conflict by persuading Yugoslavia to adhere to the demands of NATO. In this position they could protect Serbian interest the best.

The use of ground forces

The fourth option, the most agressive one, is the use of ground forces to stop the human tragedy in Kosovo. Ground forces could push out the Serbian, Yugoslav, security forces out of Kosovo. They could than create a cordon around Kosovo to implement the proposals of the Rambouillet agreement and to protect it from any Serbian incursions.

The use of ground forces is possible even if there are a number of problems which have to be overcome. First, organise a force of about 80.000 personell. Second, deploy them to the region. Third, improve the infra-structure in Albania to simplify deployment and the logistic support and fourth chose a way into Kosovo.

The resistance of the Yugoslav army could be fierce but should not be overestimated. The quality and quantity of the forces are clearly below the level of NATO forces. The Yugoslav armed forces have been neglected in the preceding five years. There have been no modernisations and the training has been below standard out a lack of funds. Milosevic preferred the police and special police forces as they were politically more reliable and as good in the low level, counter insurgency, operations Milosevic preferred to wage. In all recent problems with Slovenia, Croatia and in Bosnia the Yugoslav armed forces pulled out without a fight and they did not do that out of superiority. And finally after the NATO air campaign the Yugoslav armed forces have been degraded, demoralised and logistically crippled. Impressive against unarmed civilians and usefull against a lightly armed inexperienced guerilla-like organisation like the UCK-KLA but no adversary against an all-arms NATO combat force.

There are four roads into Kosovo. Firstly, from the south through Macedonia. This would be the best way considered the connections with harbours in Greece and the relativily good developed inroads into Kosovo. The Macedonian government opposes however any offensive operations out of Macedonia because of the large group of Serbians in the country. And Greece is not particularly keen on supporting an offensive because of religious connections and traditional good relations with Serbia. Secondly, from Albania which would meet no political objections but would require extensive construction of infra-structure. The inroads into Kosovo are a little more difficult but poses no impregnable barrier. Thirdly, through Montenegro. This would be possible because of the harbour facilities in Montenegro. There are two objections to this plan, first you have to conquer the harbour and in a worst case situation you would have to fight yourself through the country. Military it would not pose to be impossible or difficult but it would be a big nuisance. Second, the mountain range between Montenegro and Kosovo are the heighest in the region which would make it more difficult to cross them. And fourthly, from the north out of Hungary. The Hungarian government has allowed NATO to use bases in Hungary. This would be the easiest entry into Yugoslavia. The geography is the most suitable as there are no mountains to limit movements. The military resistance of the Yugoslav armed forces will be the same as in Kosovo where as in Kosovo they have the advantage of defensive favourable terrain. But they should not rely on favourable terrain to beat of an offensive opponent, as Julius Caesar stated in his book the Gallic War; people in some geographic areas, like mountains, rely on the terrain for their defense but every determined force will break their defense. The Hungarian route is military feasible but it requires a larger logistic effort. The advantage of this entry are that any possible problems in the Vojvodina between the Hungarian minority and a Serbian nationalistic plan could be solved before it surfaces, all installations which could become a threat could be destroyed, any logistic support for the Serbian forces in Kosovo could be destroyed at the source and people accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity could be apprehended. The real problems with the Hungarian road are political, Russia will not be happy, more likely very angry, if this road was used. The Russians and many other states would view it as an illegal act of agression against Serbia.

All possible entry points, except probably the Montenegro road, are possible. The road which would meet the littlest problems is through Albania as there is only one big problem the missing infra-structure.

The Future of Kosovo

President Milosevic is fighting, or better sitting out, a lost battle. His calculations that he could solve the Kosovo problem by ethnic cleansing and create facts which cannot be turned back will prove to be false. The NATO air campaign will continue until the Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army have left the region. The NATO did not get divided about the Kosovo conflict but stood firm in support of the policy decided on. And there is no country, even not Russia, who going to help him. Yugoslavia receives some political or moral support but not the much needed arms and physical back up.

However and whenever the conflict will end is up to Milosevic, if he decides to cede to the demands of withdrawal of the Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav armed forces, the implementation of self determination for the Kosovo-Albanians and the installation of an international force with a large number of NATO forces, more or less what is stated in the Rambouillet agreement, the air campaign will stop immediately. Until now, the end of April 1999, Yugoslavia still has a small chance to influence the outcome of the conflict and the future position of Kosovo. If they wait another month or so, time or reality will make the choices for them.

The other option is that the NATO will, if they do not use ground forces themselve, with increasing support of the UCK-KLA destroy the Serbian security forces and army units in Kosovo and all the important logistics, support and infra-structure in Yugoslavia. Consequently, on the medium to long term the UCK-KLA will take over Kosovo and than it will be independent. There will be no negotiations or any role for Yugoslavia left in Kosovo.

The future of Kosovo will be determined by the Kosovo-Albanians. After the Serbian forces left the region Kosovo will be a semi-independent state on the short term. After the refugees have returned to their homes the final position of Kosovo will be determined. It can be an autonomous province in Yugoslavia as proposed in the Rambouillet agreement but more likely it will be an independent state considering the atrocities committed by the Serbs and the efforts of the Kosovo-Albanians, the UCK-KLA, to return to Kosovo.

A reunion with Albania, to create a great Albania, will probably be a bridge to far. Albania has to many problems of their own to expand and get even more problems. And the international community might disagree with a great Albania because they could consider it as potential new problem which could lead to a new conflict between neighbours. The Kosovo-Albanians and the Albanians have to be carefull whay they do as they are in need of western economic support to reconstruct their countries. And a new conflict between Macedonia and Albania is the last the thing the west is willing to tolerate.

The future of the Balkan could be with a small and impoverished Yugoslavia if it makes the wrong choices. The international community, the U.S.A. and the Europan Community, are planning an economic support package for the Balkan. This mini-Marschall plan should not only support Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia in the reconstruction of their economies but is aimed at the Balkan as a whole. Roumania, Bulgaria and possibly even Yugoslavia are included in this plan. The plan should boost the economies, support and promote democracy, civil rights, trade and cultural exchanges and start a self-supporting economic growth in the region.

The creation of political, economical and social stability in the Balkan is the key to peace and progress. It will be the only way to break the negative spiral of poverty and conflict in the region. The peoples of the Balkan have to be learned to live together and solve conflicts and disagreements by diplomacy instead of resorting to nationalistic and tribal inspired violence at the first possible occasion.