July 2015.II, AQI to ISIS/ISIL to IS/Daesh

ISIS/ISIL, the start of a movement

ISIS/ISIL, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria / Islamic State in Iraq and Levant originated in Iraq after Saddam Hussayn was removed out of power. After the Baath party lost power, the Sunni minority who used to run the country lost their prominent position.

This resulted in a civil war like situation when several Sunni groups started fighting the government. An Al Qaeda franchise, Al Qaeda in Iraq, AQI, became the most famous as they were more or less successful and very brutal/violent in their actions. The US military and the Iraqi government could with the help of Sunni clans suppress most of the actions of the Al Qaeda in Iraq.

At this moment when they were close to being defeated former Saddam Hussayn secret service operatives took over the organization of this group. This becomes clear after looking at the hierarchy of the group. There are a lot of former members of Saddam’s military and secret service active. Rather successfully they rebuilded the group and started a little later to work under the name of ISIS or ISIL.

The design of former military and secret service agents is clearly visible in the way the group is organized, how they conduct operations, how they expand their territory, how they maintain internal and external security and how to attract people.

To attract followers they introduced in their opinion to most pure form of Islam, to live according the Quran and Hadith. In a very strict interpretation. And to bring back the leading position of Sunni muslims in Iraq, for them their “natural” leadership role. The main objective of ISIS/ISIL is that they are fighting for a strict interpretation of the Islam, where Muslims can live and do their prayers and are protected from evil influences.

It is their strength that they are on a mission of God, fight till the end and willing to make any sacrifice. Impressive for less trained people/groups but easy game for a well trained military unit.

Large parts of the Iraqi province of Anbar could be taken over. But it is not densely populated, a lot of desert and inhabited by Sunni muslims. At the beginning their natural allies/followers. Not all enlargements were on the battlefield but clans were also persuaded to join/follow IS as they would bring back the better days of the Saddam era.

When the civil war in Syria started it was the opportunity for the movement to expand their operations. They could take over large parts of Syria. And became ISIS/ISIL.

In Syria they could establish in Raqqa their capital and declare themself as the caliphate. Just like the historical caliphates in Damascus and Baghdad. As they declared the caliphate, they start calling themself IS, Islamic State.

As IS, caliphate, they could attract more followers and expand through the integration of Islamic groups in other countries. Like in Nigeria, Libya, Afghanistan and Indonesia.

They initially gained the most followers by living and ordering people to live the most pure way of Islam, their successes on the battlefield, their harsh and brutal manners to govern the areas under their control and the spectacular, sometimes cruel, executions of prisoners, enemies of IS.

IS is/was not only fighting in Syria with Assad but also with rebel groups like the FSA and Jahbat Al Nusra. Because of the in-fighting the Syrian military could regain territory. Assad could however not profit fully from the division between the several groups in Syria. All are in a kind of stalemate, not strong enough to defeat the other groups.

But in 2014 with the take over of Mosul in Iraq IS had become the most successful and effective group in the area. They control substantial parts of Iraq and Syria. And more important IS could in the beginning generate enough financial resources to maintain a country/caliphate.

Turning point

The control of Mosul, Tikrit, Fallujah and Kobane (nearly) was the zenith of their power. There was even fear that IS would make it to Baghdad. Iraqi military incompetence and corruption was the main reason IS could relatively easy take over that large area.

But it was also the wake up call for the Iraqi government that they had got to get serious about the defensive and offensive capabilities of the military and the several Shia militias.

Resistance against IS became more organized and the USA and several other countries, including Arab countries, started to support the Iraqi government and several anti-IS groups with equipment, training and air support.

The Kurdish YPG could, after some initial difficulties, take Kobane back from IS who nearly had taken over control of this Kurdish town on the Turkish border.

Most clashes with YPG forces ended badly for IS. Air support gave the YPG the firepower needed to defeat IS more easily.

IS could enlarge its territory after loosing Kobane in Syria and Tikrit in Iraq but it could not make up the total losses since the fall of Kobane. They had to retreat in northern Syria and in Anbar province in Iraq.

Outside the Iraq-Syria area, IS could expand by accepting other groups in their organization. In most countries IS followers want to join, some are just individuals, some are groups and some are existing groups who had been part of another organization like Al Qaeda. Those are attracted to IS because of their successes on the battlefield but also because of the idea of a pure way of Islamic living.

The new members of IS are not established groups. They have to fight to keep their own territories. In Libya for example the local IS affiliate could take control of Sirte but lost Derna to an Al Qaeda allied group. In Afghanistan, groups who consider the Taliban not pure enough joined IS but this led to some serious in-fighting in the Taliban. The integration of Boko Haram in Nigeria into IS has been smoothly. But the recent operations of the government, with support of “military advisers“ of STTEP and neighboring countries, against Boko Haram has pushed them out of many territories they controlled.

IS can attract many people/groups but joining IS isn’t necessarily a success. It will give such a group some standing, sometimes some financial support and training but also more decisiveness in fighting it, as the brutality of IS is an additional incentive to keep them out, e.g. defeat them.

The defeats on the battlefield and the predator-like way of collecting “taxes”, money, translated into lesser income, money, for IS to finance their activities. Running a state is expensive as it will need a constant flow of money to make it work. The drop in the price of oil was the final nail to the coffin of the revenues of IS.

The future of IS

The fighting of IS and against IS will continue for some time. They will not be defeated easily. They are operating in a chaotic part of the world. Syria is involved in a large and lasting civil war with no group at the moment strong enough to create a decisive strategy and firepower to defeat the other contestants. In Iraq the situation is different as there is not really a civil war going on but the weakness of the Iraqi armed forces and the problems with several Shia militias will make it rather difficult to have a fast advance and take over of the territories under control of IS.

The Kurdish groups, united in the KRG, in the north of Iraq are better equipped with weapons and trained to fight IS but they still lack a lot of necessary equipment. The Iraqi government is not delivering all support they receive for the north to the KRG as they fear that the KRG will demand autonomy/independence from Iraq. The KRG will be able to move against IS in the north of Iraq as it gains strength every month. The KRG could take Mosul but it would be difficult without support from the Iraqi armed forces. And they act slowly because of the known shortcoming against IS. But in the end they will be there and do their part.

With the exception of some parts of the province of Anbar most of Iraq will be happy to see IS go. IS will keep a substantial following in Iraq under the Sunnis. They want to regain their former position but that will proof to be impossible. IS will be in Iraq reduced to a small, terrorist, organization. Which can be dealt with police, para-military and some special forces.

The situation in Syria is more complicated as the civil war will extend any fight against IS. If IS is weakened or defeated it will be beneficial for Assad, he will loose one of the major rebel groups against his government.

IS could stay in Syria but it is under threat as the Kurdish YPG is moving towards the self proclaimed capital of IS, Raqqa. At the moment they will wait for reinforcements from Arab rebel groups like Jahbat Al Nusra, the remnants of the FSA and others before they will attack Raqqa. The Arab rebel groups are necessary because the relations between the Kurds and Arabs are not that good. The Arabs suspect the Kurdish YPG to expel them out of the area.

IS is under severe stress as the YPG is pushing the forces of IS out of the northern territories. Those areas are very important to IS as they deliver new manpower and support via Turkey.

At first Turkey considered IS not a direct threat. You could make deal with them. They could arrange that the diplomatic staff taken by IS in Mosul was released. Later they saw them as a useful kind of ally as they fought the YPG, Syrian Kurds. They are in turn allied with the PKK, the Turkish Kurdish party.

After the suicide attack of IS on a Turkish/Kurdish town, Suruc, Ankara realized that IS is an uncontrollable projectile. Which should be destroyed as it would destabilize the whole Middle East.

The Turkish reaction to an attack on their territory was air strikes at IS positions, YPG and the PKK. This has tipped the scales even further against IS. And at the same time they could gain indirectly support of NATO in the attack of PKK and YPG targets. This will weaken the Kurdish case, autonomy or even independence for one or more Kurdish state(s). The attack at the PKK/YPG is at the same time an electoral movement of prime-minister Erdogan. He can show that he will defend Turkey against every threat, IS and PKK. This double or even triple strategy should minimize the threat of any Kurdish ambitions in Turkey, at the same time could it deliver an electoral success and IS could be defeated which will deliver Turkey extra credits in the West.

Turkish firepower, airstrikes, and the permission for the USA to station forces in Turkey will be even more damaging to IS. But Turkish involvement comes with a price. They will also attack Kurdish YPG and PKK targets in the area to limit/end any Kurdish ambition.

Turkey and the USA even want to create a safe zone in a part of the north of Syria to prevent that the Kurdish YPG/PKK will take control the border region.

The support of the Kurdish YPG is absolutely necessary in the fight against IS. You can’t win a war from the air. You will need feet on the ground to defeat IS and take control over the area, people, living there.

IS does not have many friends in the area. They have made enemies with about every group, clan, state or even people in the area. With the exception of course of some Sunni clans/people in Anbar.

The future of IS does not look good, to many enemies and the resources, financially and militarily, get depleted and are more difficult to restock. The harsh treatment of the people living in the areas under control of IS will lead eventually to uprisings, rebellion, from the inside. The several poisonings of IS fighters and the many people that want to get away are the first signs of resistance against IS.

IS have, as many dictatorial regimes, their own republican guard, the Shield of Islam. A military brigade, better trained, armed and paid and above all absolutely loyal to IS. The Shield of Islam should protect the leadership and keep the common IS fighters committed to the fight/Jihad. But if the Shield of Islam becomes a priority target and the IS fighting groups get beaten most of the time it will even become more difficult to keep all and everybody under control.

IS will most likely have a hard time in the coming months. Slowly they will loose territory in Iraq and Syria. The intervention from Turkey could cause some delay as the YPG/PKK have been and will be targeted by the Turkish air force. But IS have been and will be hit harder and more as they are also on the hitlist of the USA and co.

IS will not be able to hold on to their caliphate, country-like, structure with their capital Raqqa. In Iraq and Syria they will return to a less organized/structured group. Groups will have to start operate more independently and will be more dependent on looting and only occasional support form IS leadership.

In Iraq they will be loosing more and faster territory and power. The Kurdish KRG gets better organized, trained and armed. The Iraqi armed forces get support from the USA and Iran in training and armament. The Shia militias continue to play a major role in the capturing of IS occupied territory. The militias get more experienced and are fighting kind of for their own survival. IS consider the Shia as heretics and deserve to be killed. The fight between those two will often lead to mass killlings as taking prisoners is not their style.

IS will in Syria probably fall back as one of the many Islamic radical groups fighting Assad. The only commonality between all those groups is the wish to remove the Assad regime and install an Islamic republic.

In the last year the more moderate FSA has been marginalized between Jahbat Al Nusra and IS. A USA trained and funded group is also under attack of Al Nusra. Their commander and a few men have been kidnapped by Al Nusra after a conference of rebel groups. The situation is pretty chaotic about who is supporting who and who are working together. There are often ad hoc groups but rarely for the longer term.

The differences between all groups will give the Assad government a very good chance to survive on the short term and even longer. The chance to defeat all groups and keep Syria in one part might be not possible for Assad. But with the help of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah they might be able to secure the areas they have under control.

The re-approachment between the USA and Iran, the end of the sanctions against Iran and the importance of Syria for Russia will mean a continuation of and probably more support for the Assad government.

IS will be forced to seek more and better cooperation with other groups, the bad name and track record of IS will not make that easier. They have collected a lot of hate and fear. Which can be beneficial in a fight but a drawback in negotiations or if looking for partners.

They will however continue to receive support from abroad but that will not directly translate to support on the battlefield in firepower, men or finances. Internationally they can rally support of a large part of the Sunni Muslim community, especially youths. But in large part this is based on some kind of admiration of the “Islamic warrior” idea and that the much disliked USA, a.k.a. Western countries, are occasionally attacked. In the war in Syria they cannot and will not be of any help.

IS will be reduced from caliphate with capital to one of several radical Islamic groups fighting Assad and the Kurdish YPG and PKK in Syria. And IS will be also fighting the Kurdish KRG and the Iraqi Shia government in Iraq. And probably even some Sunni tribes in Syria and Iraq who have enough of the strict and brutal rule of IS. In the mean time they will remain dangerous and deadly and will continue fighting as a organization propagating a strict Islamic society with terrorism as its main weapon. Time could in the end turn them into history.