February 1998

February 1998

February 1998

Security changes in the Asian-Pacific region – Iraq, the next battlefield?

Security changes in the Asian-Pacific region

The Asian-Pacpific region

The Asian-Pacific region stretches from the northern territories of Australia in the South to the southern tip of Sahkalin island in the North. This wide area with many different countries with even more different peoples have been the prime example of a successfull economic development. The GDP’s, the technological capabilities and even the self esteem of these countries was booming.

The large currency devaluations in Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and South Korea and the following economic breakdown in essentially the whole Asian-Pacific region destroyed many big dreams in the region. The wish to become a developed country in their own manner and on the the fast lane was dashed within a couple months because of the already to often mentioned reasons.

Only a couple of countries could remain untouched by the problems in the region. China, Hong Kong and Taiwan could remain more or less stable with a negative reaction on the stock markets and a slow down in sales/exports. But even they, epecially China, have their economic problems. The large inefficient and uncapable Chinese state industry is a heavy mortgage on the economic development of China.

The exception is Japan. The economy of Japan has been depressed since the bubble economy of the eighties bursted. The crisis in Asia have been the reason for the further decreasing of the stock market and the bankruptcy of some large financial institutions. The bankruptcies were also an internal Japanese problem because of failing government policies and control and inappropriate bookkeeping and management in the companies. Japan is however strong enough in resources and knowledge to get business on order again if they are finally willing to settle the problems in the financial sector. But this will need a change of culture in Japanese politics and business customs.

The security situation

The security situation of the Asian-Pacific region will not be inbalanced by the recent difficulties. The independent movements and/or small leftovers from the communist insurgencies in some countries will try to benefit from the economic difficulties but in the end their causes will be to insignificant for the people to change something. They have other things on their mind then ideology or etno/religious -nationalism. To quote Berthold Brecht; “first food than the moral”.

The border squabbles which a large number of countries in the region have with eachother will also be in a state of suspension on the short term. All countries in the region will be to occupied in getting their economies on order before they will be able to settle their border differences.

The military equipment programmes which are planned and partly implemented by numerous countries, like Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, will be stretched, deferred, refinanced and even some very ambitious programs like the submarine program in Thailand be cancelled. The major equipment provider to the region, the U.S.A., is supporting this policy and is pressing companies to be flexible on the delivery schedules and payment on the orders of the countries in trouble.

The U.S.A. wants to maintain the stability in the region. It is important for them to keep the programmes alive to protect the security of each country, to satisfy the needs of the military establishment and at the same time support the economy through the offset and compensation programmes associated with the sales. Ofcourse the U.S.A. also wants to protect its market.

The two countries, China and Taiwan, who are in the position to influence the situation are at the same time also the most controversial in their support. Both countries will be tempted to bind the support to conditions and this will have a worsening effect on the stability on the longer term.

China can and has supported some countries who are suffering from the crises. The resources of China are however limited. The Chinese currency reserves are about 140 B. US dollar. This sum might look very big, as it is, but if we consider the resources needed to avoid a devaluation of the Hong Kong dollar and the internal economic problems of China, the money will be very badly needed by the Chinese themselve. If the support which given by China is politically connected then they will create a lot of hard feelings for the future. Finally the Chinese statement that they will not devaluate the Yuan, the Chinese currency, are nothing more then words. First they have already devaluated the Yuan in 1994 with 35 % and second another devaluation would be bad for the Chinese economy because they will loose the trust of international investors.

Taiwan is in a similar position, it also can and has supported a number of countries. The Taiwanese financial resources are about the half of China but the Taiwanese economy and industry is in much better shape than the Chinese one. Taiwanese entrepeneurs are already involved in the South-East Asian economies through large investments. These investments of Taiwan in S-E Asia are part of the South-movement of the Taiwanese government to be less dependent on China where the bulk of Taiwanese investments are placed. This familiarity with the S-E Asian markets will make Taiwanese support very usefull in the recovering phase.

Taiwan might be, even more than China, tempted to get a kind of recognition from the countries they help. But this will increase the hostility between China and Taiwan and it forces the Asian countries to choose sides.

Most of the countries in trouble will accept the support but they will not recognize Taiwan and continue to view the relations the same as before the crisis. The acceptance of Taiwanese support could however be already to much for the Chinese wishes. China only seems to accept Taiwanese support if it is absolutely free of any political connection.

The Asian economic disaster will limit the differences between a number of countries on the short term. The policy implemented in this crisis will however set the stage for the future cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region. If China and Taiwan are to much focused on eachother the results could dangerous. On the long term the tension between China and Taiwan could raise to unprecedented levels. This will place a number of countries, like Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, in a dilemma. They have already differences with China and want to limit Chinese power but they also do not want to make China to a direct enemy because of Taiwan.

The crisis has proved that the U.S.A. is indispensable in the region. They are the stabilising factor which are able to help with economic problems as with possible political tensions in the area. China is faraway from being the power it wants to be in the region. They do not have the means to solve economic problems and are viewed as a country with geographical ambitions.

Iraq, the next battlefield?

The fullfillment of the U.N. resolutions, of eliminating all Weapons of Mass Destructions, WMD, seems to get more difficult as the second Gulf War is further away. The search of inspection teams to capabilities to build and the storage of WMD is being hindered by Iraqi security forces and by the refusal to let inspections teams into presidential palaces and properties.

The U.S.A. is however pressing for the fullfillment of the resolutions. They are supported by the U.K. Most of the other states agree with the U.S.A. that Iraq has to give up all capabilities which are related to WMD. They are however less willing to use violence to reach that goal. The large majority of Arab countries are against using military means where as Russia and France could be persuaded to agree to the use of air assaults but they will not actively support the assault.

The Arab countries, France and Russia are even pressing for the elemination of the embargo towards Iraq. They think cooperation and trade relations will be more successfull.

As the last remaining superpower the U.S.A. is determined to press Iraq into obeying to the U.N. resolutions. Iraq on the other hand is using all means available to split the international community. Saddam has interpreted the new situation in the Middle East very good. With exploiting the inconsistencies of the U.S. Middle East policy and the policy of offering a little and making at the same time objections to the composition of the inspection teams and refusing entry to some places he could forestall a creation of a new alliance against Iraq.

Problems with an assault on Iraq

An attack on Iraq will be a very difficult operation. The problem is not the launching of air strikes and missiles into Iraq but everything associated with an assault.

The U.S. will not be able to get the same support for this action as it had in the second Gulf War. It will be an operation with just a handfull other countries like the U.K. and political backing of Kuwait. The U.S. will loose a lot of friends in the Arab world especially their two biggest allies, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. These two countries would have a lot of difficulties to justify the support of a U.S. lead attack on an Arab country. Especially if one considers the large fundamentalistic organisations in those countries.

As mentioned above the launching of air strikes and missiles is not difficult. The problems start with the sense and usefullness of an air strike, the identification of the right targets and the proper elimination of those targets.

The use of airpower to solve problems can be usefull if the attacked party is sensitive towards the effects of such an air strike or in coordination with combined arms assault. In the case of Iraq, it will not be very effective. It is not possible to cripple the whole society by the use of massive air strikes. The results will be devastating, if not only military and industrial sites are attacked but also the infra-structure and other civil targets are destroyed. The long term civilian casualties, especially by the following epidemics, will be very high in the populated areas but the regime will still be in power. Beside that it will not change the leadership of Iraq, an assault on civilian targets is politically unacceptable.

To change the policies of Iraq one have to remove Saddam out of power or find a way to live with him. There are three ways to eliminate him. First, have the luck to get him in an air strike. This will be very difficult because Saddam is fully aware of this threat and therefore impossible to pinpoint. Further the U.S. have to violate executive order 12333 which forbids the elimination of foreign heads of state. But the executive order is the least of all problems.

Second, hope that an internal coup d’etat removes him from power, but the secret service is very capable in eliminating possible threats to Saddam.

And third, move in with a ground force, but this is political not feasible and if the forces have to stay on for a longer term it will be very dangerous.

The identification of targets will prove to be very difficult. After several years of research the inspection teams still have not yet found all sites. Thereby the Iraqis have become, because of the second Gulf War and the embargo period, specialists in hiding equipment/goods from being found. The military forces will be spread around the country and everything connected with WMD will be hidden. For example biological weapons can be designed and build in a large house, chemical weapons can be manufactured in a farm with a couple of large barns. Only the construction of nuclear weapons need a larger space but this can be done at several smaller sites. And finally you can hide a lot of production capacity in the existing agri-chemical production complexes. With the exception of the existing production sites all other sites will be impossible to target.

The number of clear targets is limited and they will be moving around to make it even more difficult to target them. One should remember the impossibility of the allied forces to capture one missile Scud launcher in the second Gulf War.

Finally a number of complexes will be bunkers who are very deep and well constructed. The U.S. will not be able to destroy these bunkers with existing conventional weapons and the ones in development. Even when they have received the ground plans of German and Yugoslav construction companies who builded a number of those sites. To destroy these sites you need a small nuclear device. The use of nuclear weapons could however create a precedence. As a result every self-respecting defence force will find that it needs nuclear devices to protect the interests of their country. Especially the nations in the Middle East.

Conclusion

The use of military means, air strikes, to force Iraq to obey the U.N. resolutions will be a fruitless affair. The U.S. is certainly be capable to hurt Iraq very badly but it is not enough, as long as they do not use ground forces, to remove Saddam out of power. The impact is not of that scale that the power structures will be destroyed. The Iraqi people will be the ones who will suffer most of an massive air strike. The position of Saddam will most probably be improved after an assault. The national and international “admiration” of Saddam, as the only man who has guts to resist the only superpower in the world, will grow. If it does not kill him it will make him stronger.

The U.S.A. will probably use violence, strike Iraq, to try to make Saddam obey the resolutions. The results will be minimal, with some luck Saddam will allow the inspectors more space to move but they will not find more then they have done till now. He will continue to tease the U.S.A. and the U.N. and this will weaken the influence of the U.S.A. in the Middle East.

The U.S.A. would be better advised if they would use the threat of force with diplomacy, the carrot and stick method. If Saddam gives in to the wishes of the U.N. he will get more freedom to move. The oil for food program is nice but it is not enough to persuade Saddam to obey to the U.N. resolutions. Saddam maybe an unpleasant leader to deal with but he is in power and will most probably be so in the future. Somebody who is participating in the world community can be more or less be controlled. If somebody has nothing to loose he will be more likely to react contrary to what is expected if he is under threat.

A comprehensive Middle East policy from the U.S.A. with equal treatment and chances for all countries in the Middle East will be more promising to regain the influence the U.S.A. has lost since the peace process has fallen apart. The U.S.A. as the remaining superpower has the obligation to have a balanced policy and to be a fair broker in world politics.

 

 

Standaard