April 2013, I

Syria; an endgame without an end

Syria, an assessment

The conflict in Syria has been going on for a couple of years without any victory in sight, if you can speak about victory in a conflict which has already cost over 70.000 casualties.

The Assad government wants to remain in power because the alternative is absolutely not acceptable for them. As the track record of atrocious behaviour of the security forces and the militias created and supported by the Assad regime is that bad that any peaceful solution or any negotiations for that matter are out of the question. It will ultimately mean death for Assad and co.

The opposition, in some way allied within the SNC, Syrian National Coalition, with its military arm, FSA, Free Syrian Army, which consists out of numerous independent fighting groups strongly connected to one area are nearly just as focussed on the defeat of the other side.

With a third party somewhat of an outsider, the Kurdish PYD in the north-east of the country wanting independence or at least autonomy.

The fighting between the two opponents have been long and messy with little progress. None of the parties could enforce a decision and both used their advantages, the government has/had superior firepower and logistics and the opposition has/had the initiative, popular support, better tactics and lately ever more foreign support including more advanced weapons and ammunition.

The Assad government concentrated their forces at the most important areas/points and the Alewite/Druze/Christian homelands to protect their regime. Leaving most of the rest of the country with little to none resistance to the opposition. Fighting between the two sides occured mostly at those contested important areas/points, like Damascus and especially Aleppo.

The recently received additional Western support, especially the weapons and ammunition, immediately made a difference. The FSA could go on the offensive and take on the Syrian army in Damascus and Aleppo and press on and continue the battle. Until now the FSA was often limited in its operations because of the lack of supplies, especially ammunition.

In the mean time the logistical situation for the government is worsening, stocks get lesser, soldiers and officers desert and even long trusted Russian and Iranian support diminishes. The first by intention the second by situation.

The Kurdish north-east of the country is another ball game. The PYD was divided whom to support, Assad or the SNC/FSA. They considered them both as possbile friends or foes. They fight for their own cause, autonomy at least or independence preferred for their Kurdistan. The PYD managed to keep both contestors out of the region. The government left voluntarily, the FSA has been more or less forced out. For both sides the Kurdish territories are not of urgent interest as both have other more important battle fields, areas, to contest.

The future of the Assad regime

Due to the deteriorating combat, logistical, financial and political situation and the improving situation of the FSA, the chance of survival for Assad and his regime will be very unlikely. Within 12 to 18 months, 6 if given western air support, the Assad government will be defeated, they’ll have lost Damascus, Aleppo and other strategic important areas. Assad and his most loyal forces can however survive a long time in the Alawite home areas but not forever.

The rate of desertion will most likely increase in the coming months forcing Assad to rely only on his most loyal security forces and his less capable but even more brutal militia forces. Because of lesser forces available Assad and co will be forced to concentrate their forces. Logically they will withdraw to the coastal areas taking as much arms and ammunition with them, including the much feared biological and chemical weapons.

The survival in the coastal home areas will depend on the unity in the FSA and of course, to a lesser extent, the level of support, air support, from the West.

International, Arab and Western, support, weapons, ammunition, intelligence, training and other logistical support will be absolute necessary to defeat Assad. Without it, it will become very difficult as the firepower, the level of organization and the supplies are still better and larger at the Assad side.

The FSA as an organization

The FSA is a collection of independent groups with the common aim to defeat the Assad regime. All groups have their own leader and the followers are loyal to their leader and not to the FSA or SNC per se. The strength of each group is also very different. The number of men under arms, the quality of the weapons and the availability of ammunition used to vary a lot. If they’re out of stock, the men would go home and would continue if the ammunition would be resupplied.

The FSA can be divided in about two kind of groups, the moderate groups wanting a new government with some kind of democratic system and the other group of Islamic fundamentalistic groups who also want a new government but then a Islamic republic, with Allah and the Sharia as the leading principle. The moderates constitute the majority but the Islamists are the most agressive and daring. In fighting the government the Islamic groups are more effective and successful. They will demand a price, a role if Assad will be defeated, and are certainly willing and able to fight for their demands.

This is going to be the major weakness in the fight against Assad and especially in the time there after. The several more or less independent groups with different levels of capability and support will be a major problem as there is no central and strong system and hierarchy of control and command.

All groups are more or less represented in the FSA leadership, with the exeption of the Islamic fundamentalists. And even this leadership is divided, as the previous moderate leader Mouaz al-Khatib resigned his position as the hardliners rejected any form of negotiations.

The lack of unity can and will be the biggest problem for the FSA and SNC, as long as Assad is still in command in Damascus, the groups will cooperate and continue to fight against Assad. But there after?

An end without and end

The future of Syria looks bleak as Assad is still not defeated and also still has some potential to fight and be dangerous. But this is more or less just a matter of time but the time there after will be much more troublesome and demanding.

Syria could end up with four different groups fighting each other. A complicated civil war with each group fighting each other and with little common ground to negotiate and to cooperate.

The moderates, the Islamic fundamentalists, the Kurds and of course the minorities of Alawites, Druze and Christians with or without Assad. All will fight and continue to fight as giving up or loosing is not an option.

The committed atrocities by all sides, the culture of revenge and honor and the strong religious differences between Sunni, Shia and Christians are all reasons for a long fight were only a total exhaustion could end the conflict or create a balance of power between three or four different areas, new countries, as two groups are strongly bound to an area.